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Made In Oman 
Abstract: Oman’s manufacturing sector has shown 
promising growth during the past decades. This paper 
analyzes the role of the manufacturing and export sector in 
economic growth and development. Then, after analyzing 
government policy toward manufacturing in Oman, this 
paper uses research gathered from companies in Rusayl to 
determine the biggest problems currently facing 
manufacturing in Oman and the effectiveness of 
government policy toward the sector. Problems found 
included excessive bureaucracy, Omanization, and transport 
costs. These findings were then presented to the appropriate 
public institutions, with their reactions documented. 
Recommendations for change include streamlining 
government services, expediting the construction of the Gulf 
Railway, and implementing an innovative credit-based 
s o l u t i o n  t o  O m a n i z a t i o n .  
Introduction 
 During the past four decades, one of the most salient policies of the Omani government 
has been the diversification of the national economy away from oil revenue. Each of Oman’s 
eight five-year-plans, issued under Royal Decrees 1/76, 1/81, 1/86, 1/91, 1/96, 1/2001, 1/2006, 
and 1/2011, has addressed the issue in some form. In Oman’s Vision 2020 development goals, 
issued in 1996 under Royal Decree 1/96, there is an entire chapter dedicated to economic 
diversification, with other chapters addressing issues ancillary to it. The importance of 
diversification for Oman increases with each passing year. As the oil reserves, which have 
supported Oman’s economy for the past 40 years, dwindle, Oman is forced to find alternate 
sectors on which its economy can rely. Sectors such as tourism and agriculture have shown 
significant growth and should not be ignored, but relative to the size of the national economy 
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they cannot seriously be expected to support the country. According to statistics published by 
the Ministry of the National Economy in August 2010, the two sectors combined contributed 
less than 3% of the national GDP (MONE 4). However, one sector which has shown promising 
growth is manufacturing. Manufacturing, a sector which is second in size only to petroleum-
based activities, accounts for slightly over 12% of the national economy – however, with time 
and prudent governmental policy the manufacturing sector has the potential to grow 
substantially, especially as more companies begin to export to foreign markets. However, it has 
been observed that the manufacturing sector development has been met with a lack of 
enthusiasm by public institutions. For example, on its website the Ministry of the National 
Economy has no public data available for this sector, despite having significant data in others. 
This paper aims to identify current governmental policies toward manufacturing and identify 
faults within or ways in which they can be improved. 
 The paper is structured such that Section 1 provides a basic overview of the role of 
manufacturing in economic development, including case studies, Section 2 gives an overview of 
development in Oman since 10970, Section 3 covers the research and conclusions drawn from 
field research undertaken for this paper, and Section 4 concludes with recommendations for 
policy change. 
 
Methodology 
Research data for this document was gathered through the following methods: 
• Direct interviews with representatives from companies located in the Rusayl Industrial 
Estate (RIE). Interviews were conducted during a two week period in April 2011. 
• Direct interviews with representatives from the Minister of Commerce and Industry 
(MOCI), the Chamber of Commerce (OCCI), and the Public Establishment for Industrial 
Estates (PEIE). Interviews were conducted during a three week period in April-May 2011. 
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• Questionnaires distributed to companies in RIE. Questionnaires were distributed 
without regard to company size or product. Of the 21 companies approached, responses 
were received from only 15. Data was gathered during a two week period in April 2011. 
As a result of insupressible concerns over anonymity for both themselves and their company 
from the representatives interviewed, very few of the interviews conducted in Rusayl were 
recorded – written notes were taken and significant statements (appearing in quotations) were 
noted verbatim. A similar problem was observed with government officials over their desire not 
to be recorded ‘officially’ – the same process was used for them as well. 
 
Section 1: The Role of Industry in Development 
 
Previous Findings on Manufacturing and Export Development 
Because of the importance of manufacturing as well as its potential to fundamentally change 
and economy, there have been incredible amounts of research pertaining to the subject. While 
industrialization, as a concept, has existed since the 19th century, this paper is mainly focused 
on more recent findings – specifically regarding manufacturing and its role in global integration. 
During the past century there have been several successful cases of manufacturing 
development, two of which, Thailand and Ireland, will be explored later. However, there have 
also been many cases of failed developmental programs – which also will be explored later in 
the paper. Manufacturing development is therefore an inherently risk-heavy undertaking which, 
if handled improperly, can have long-lasting repercussions.  
One strategy for development is free market ‘shock therapy’, referring to rapid removal of 
trade barriers. This form of market liberalization, a concept championed by Adam Smith, is a 
policy which, until recently, was long-championed by institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). It reasons that humans, being inherently rational, actin their best interest, 
and thus any established trade barrier which stops someone’s actions only serves to hinder 
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humans from achieving total efficiency. For example, some economists argue that government 
intervention can lead to distortion in resource allocation (AlRawas 16). While the concept is 
appealing, economists like Bruce Greenwald have shown that this only holds true under very 
specific market conditions, conditions which have yet to occur in any market (Greenwald 2). 
Moreover, market liberalization before adequate infrastructure is in place can have dire 
consequences, as was seen during the liberalization of Russia (Stiglitz 133). So government 
intervention is argued as just as it can correct market failures and facilitate a proper business 
environment. 
Another strategy for manufacturing development is import substitution industrialization (ISI). 
This model posits that if imports of foreign manufactured products are barred, the market will 
respond by manufacturing those products itself, thus achieving industrialization. This model, 
used in Latin America extensively during the 1950s and 60s, has been observed to show initial 
industrial growth, but, usually because of the small size of the domestic population, the growth 
eventually subsides (Primo Braga 4). Latin American governments attempted to stimulate more 
growth through increased spending,  however this only served to build foreign debt, thus 
leading to the Balance of Payment crisis in the 1980s (Primo Braga 5). Today, ISI has largely 
been disregarded as a sustainable development model, recommended in use in only very 
limited circumstances with newly developing countries. 
A more recent model of development, one which has largely replaced ISI as the preferred, is the 
export-intensive development (EOD) model, used intensively in East Asia during the 1980s and 
90s. This model, rather than employing isolationist ISI policies, encourages rapid, but controlled, 
global economic integration, with an economy focusing on exports. This is developed through 
encouraging local industries, building the skills of the labor-force, and especially through 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is critical as it brings capital into a country. 
Foreign firms, mostly multi-national corporations, invest in regional production facilities, hiring 
local labor and thus increasing capital flows. 
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Although industrial development strategies must be used on a case-by-case basis, economists 
today tend to favor gradual market liberalization coupled with an export-intensive structure, 
with government services ensuring fair business practices (Stiglitz Ch. 2).  
 
Vaulting the Resource Curse 
A well-known and much-studied phenomenon regarding countries endowed with natural 
resources is the resource curse. The resource curse refers to the seemingly inverse relationship 
between the presence of natural resources and economic prosperity. In countries like Nigeria, 
the number of people living in poverty actually increased during the exploitation of natural 
resources (Stiglitz 134).  The resource curse also wreaks havoc on development. There is a 
tendency for the presence of natural resources in a nation’s economy to detract resources 
away from other sectors, manufacturing in particular. When one sector proves to be more 
lucrative than the others, capital and human resources flock to it. As a result, when the 
lucrative sector is inevitably exhausted, the economy finds itself with little development in 
other sectors.  
Another element of the resource curse is the ‘Dutch Disease’, so called because of its 
associations with the discovery of a major natural gas reserve in the Netherlands in 1959. The 
Dutch Disease is the increase in valuation of a nation’s currency, which in effect raises the cost 
of goods produced in the economy. This effectively stymies the economy’s ability to export its 
products abroad, as its high-production costs can no longer compete in foreign markets (Stiglitz 
148). A solution to this problem, presented in detail in (Stiglitz 149), is the creation of a 
stabilization fund – a mechanism designed to lower the impact of the Dutch Disease through 
investment, which usually takes the form of buying foreign debt. This preserves the value of the 
oil revenue while at the same time keeping the currency stable, thus largely averting the Dutch 
Disease. 
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Thailand: The Surprise Asian Tiger 
A country which has shown great successes in fostering its fledgling manufacturing sector is 
Thailand. In the decades leading up to the 1980s, Thailand’s economy focused on the export of 
primary goods and ISI development policies (Hussey 2). While growth was observed, this was 
mainly a result of the realization of its agricultural sector and the United States’ involvement in 
Vietnam, which increased Thailand’s foreign aid substantially. The 1979 oil crisis, falling prices 
for Thai goods, and the exhaustion of agricultural expansion opportunities all combined to 
make Thailand’s economy one of the slowest growing in Asia during the early 1980s. In 
response to this decline, government officials and local entrepreneurs considered developing 
the manufacturing sector. Thailand began implanting policies designed to aggressively attract 
foreign investment, and it worked. Industrial investment rose from 2,867 baht in 1986 to 
24,562 baht in 1989, most of which was focused on companies which exported 80-100% of 
their products (Hussey 5). Thailand’s success in manufacturing development has been 
attributed to good timing, availability of cheap, trainable labor, sufficient port, air, road, and 
utility infrastructure, tax incentives, and streamlined, non-bureaucratic government procedures. 
Also, Thailand had political and racial stability. Finally, unlike its neighbors, such as Malaysia, 
Thailand did not mandate Thai employment (Hussey 6).  The Thai manufacturing sector grew so 
effectively that, despite only employing 15% of the workforce, it contributed to 50% of the 
country’s GDP. 
Critics of Thailand’s industrialization policies point out its neglect of impoverished rural farmers, 
which constitute 49% of the population, its environmental impact, and the 1997 financial crisis. 
It has been said that Thailand is not an industrialized country, but rather Bangkok is an 
industrialized city (Hussey 19). Outside of Bangkok there is little sign of Thailand’s 
advancements. Secondly, the rapid, unrestrained industrial process has also taken a toll on 
Bangkok’s environment. Bangkok’s water networks once led the city to be called the ‘Venice of 
the East’. However the water today, much to the distress of the Thai tourism industry, has been 
replaced by a black sludge (Hussey 23).  
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Finally, given Thailand’s rapid growth in the years leading up to 1997, it would seem as though 
the financial crisis was caused by the development policies. However, as explained by (Stiglitz 
95), this crisis came as a result of an ‘attack’ by currency speculators holding inactive assets in 
Thailand’s currency, the Baht. Investors responded to Thailand’s short term debt, thinking that 
the currency would devalue, by selling their assets, thus causing the currency, and with it the 
country, to crash. 
 
Ireland: The Celtic Tiger 
Another country which surprised the world through its emergence as a world manufacturing 
hub is Ireland. Ireland, a country which was previously wrought with political turmoil and, to a 
lesser extent, ethnic stereotyping from abroad, was able to foster a highly advanced 
manufacturing sectoring during the 1990s. Whereas Thailand capitalized on its availability of 
cheap, trainable labor, Ireland adopted policies directed towards advancing the skillset of its 
labor force and aggressively attracting foreign investment through specifically targeted 
promotion and incentives. 
Ireland’s model has been dubbed the ‘flexible development state’ (FDS) (O’Higgins 1), as it 
created a strong bond between society and state. In its Programme for National Recovery (PNR), 
started in 1987, the government focused on matching the needs of society, such as companies 
and employees, with the needs of the government. By altering policy and adjusting to societal 
needs, the government followed a very personal, flexible development path. 
Ireland also benefited from the results of previous initiatives. Free secondary education was 
provided by the government in 1967 (O’Higgins 3), as a result, by the 1990s over 80% of the 
labor force had completed secondary education, and more than 40% had third-level education 
experience. This large supply of skilled labor effectively lowered Irish skilled-labor costs relative 
to other European countries. Additionally, its labor force was comprised on English speakers, 
which, especially for high tech, internet oriented companies, made Ireland all the better as a 
location. 
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The biggest factor in Ireland’s development was FDI (O’Higgins 4). Ireland’s Industrial 
Development Agency (IDA) played a key role in this. The IDA established offices in key cities 
across the USA, marketing Ireland and establishing personal links with multi-national 
corporations (MNCs). It was given autonomy and funding to negotiate deals with firms and 
expedite services to meet demand. This specifically targeted marketing strategy came at a cost, 
but it worked. With its cheap supply of skilled, English speaking labor, and intensive 
government campaigns to market Ireland abroad, high tech companies from abroad flocked to 
the country. High tech MNCs, especially those in the Americas, saw Ireland as a gateway to 
Europe’s 300 million-strong consumer market, opening regional branches across the country. 
 
Zambia: Lessons from a Failed State 
While there have been stunning examples of manufacturing development leading to massive 
economic overhauls, it should be noted that some countries have not been as fortunate, such 
as Zambia. At its independence in 1964, 90% of Zambia’s export earnings came from raw 
copper sales. The government, devoted to industrializing the country, nationalized nearly all 
industries, owning 80% of the economy by 1969 (Osei-Hwedie 2). Using revenue from copper 
sales, the government implemented policies with the set goals of diversification away from 
copper, Zambianisation, infrastructure development, and employment creation. However these 
policies were wrought with flaws. The ISI policies instituted were unsustainable and growth 
quickly dropped, leading to the government injecting a constant stream of capital to keep the 
policies in place. As most copper revenue was devoted to this by the time the government 
invested in infrastructure there was little left to save. Without this savings fund Zambia’s 
economy was vulnerable to fluctuations in world copper prices. The ISI subsidized companies 
proved to be monopolistic, inefficient, and uncompetitive. Additionally, state intervention led 
to heavy bureaucratization and with it corruption and uncertainty, thus discouraging any 
meaningful private investment. 
At the recommendation of the World Bank and the IMF, Zambia began to liberalize its economy 
in 1983 (Osei-Hwedie 7). However this served only to worsen Zambia already troubled economy. 
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Foreign aid, which increased after Zambia’s announcement of liberalization, was mostly 
diverted to debt reduction rather than development. Additionally, attempts to privatize 
manufacturing failed miserably, corruption ran rampant, and with Zimbabwean and South 
African products entering Zambian markets, the country’s manufacturing sector was effectively 
killed. While it once held middle income-status, Zambia now stands as one of the poorest 
countries in the world (Osei-Hwedie 10). 
 
Section 2: Industrialization in Oman 
Industrial Growth in Oman 
Oman’s manufacturing sector has made a great deal of progress since 1970. Figure 1, below, 
shows Oman’s value added growth in the sector since 1961.  
Figure 1 
 
Source: World Bank (2011) 
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Before 1970, Oman’s economy was largely agricultural, showing very slow development. The 
recent discovery of oil showed a promising future, but was not being used to its full potential. 
Upon the ascension of HM Sultan Qaboos, sweeping changes were made to the way oil revenue 
was being invested. Universal primary education was made a priority, the Oman stabilization 
fund was created, and infrastructure systems were rapidly constructed. The initial industrial 
strategy was ISI-based. To attract industry, the Rusayl industrial Estate (RIE) was established in 
1983, providing infrastructure needs like electricity, water, and gas. This proved successful, with 
the manufacturing sector showing significant growth in the following years. By the 1990s, the 
development strategy shifted from ISI to diversification away from oil. To help increase 
multiplier effects on other sectors, the government emphasized the creation of linkages 
between companies. Instead of just export-led development, the government wanted to see 
companies use local materials. 
 In 1996, HM Sultan Qaboos issued the Vision 2020 development plan. This plan laid the 
groundwork to achieve a lofty vision of heavily diversified Oman, with a skilled labor force, 
global economic integration, and a promising future. By 2020, Oman would get only 19% of its 
GDP from oil and gas, be globally integrated, and boast an educated labor force. This put a 
great deal of pressure on government institutions. Industrial states were improved and 
expanded, infrastructure further developed, and more initiatives were taken to promote Oman 
abroad. 
In November 2000, Oman joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). This has generally been 
the reason attributed to the increased growth between 2000 and 2002. This gave Oman greater 
access to international markets to which manufacturers could export. Later, in 2006, Oman 
entered into a free trade agreement with the US, opening the US consumer market to Omani 
goods. 
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Oman’s Current Development Initiatives 
 
While Dubai has already earned the dubious distinction of the ‘Gulf Tiger’, Oman still has the 
potential to emerge as a key economic player. Oman is politically stable, infrastructurally sound, 
and maintains an excellent geoeconomic location. 
As identified in (Abdulrazzaq 5), there are five significant challenges currently facing all GCC 
countries. These are economic diversification, human resource development, private sector 
development, export promotion, and infrastructure development. Not incidentally, each of 
these obstacles has implications on the manufacturing sector. Oman, in its development plans, 
has taken notice of this and has put in place initiatives to help overcome these challenges. 
Economic Diversification: A very broad term, economic diversification refers to the 
development of any economic sector that can move the Omani economy away from oil 
dependency. The Vision 2020 goals laid out programs to help Oman diversify its economy. As 
was mentioned earlier, Oman hopes to see 81% of GDP come from non-oil and gas revenue. In 
order to achieve these goals it focuses diversification into sectors like tourism, agriculture, and 
manufacturing (Vision 2020). In promoting manufacturing growth, the Vision 2020 goals most 
notably promise export-led development, increased focus on SMEs, the transfer of technology, 
and increasing R&D (Vision 2020 4-4).  
An institution that was created to help encourage diversification was the Oman Development 
Bank (ODB). Established in 1997, with a reorganizing in 2006, the ODB is designed to provide 
loans to entrepreneurs looking to start a business in a sector other than the petroleum industry. 
Unlike private banks, which, acting in their best interests, avoid granting loans to risk-heavy 
undertakings, a public development bank, which has no vested interest in making a profit, is 
more likely to give loans to more risk-laden entrepreneurial ventures and thus help 
development. 
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Human Resource Development: Potentially the biggest and most pivotal challenge facing the 
Omani manufacturing sector is human resource development. Since 1970, there have been 
three noticeable stages of human development and education in Oman (Issan 1). Stage one was 
quantitative, focusing on increasing the number of Omanis attending schools. Stage two, 
started during the 1980s, focused on the quality of education in Oman. Oman is currently in 
Stage three, which began in 1995 with the declaration of the Vision 2020 development goals. 
This stage focuses on preparing Omanis to join the labor force through skill-building and post-
secondary education (Issan 1). The most recent five year plan, issued this past January, created 
programs providing local internships, support for specialized programs abroad, and physical 
support for national training projects (Oman Observer). 
The Ministry of Manpower has implemented several programs dedicated to building the skills 
of the Omani workforce. Through its Occupational Standards and Testing Center (OSTC), the 
Ministry of Manpower works with job-seekers to help improve the quality and efficiency of 
their training. The key to effective training is clear and continuous cooperation between 
training institutions and the private sector. For the private sector this means providing training 
institutions with instructions and requirements for the skills they need, and for institutions this 
means making the private enterprises aware of the importance of properly trained staff. 
Through effective communication with the private sector, both the skillset of the national 
workforce can and its net effectiveness can grow (Jax). In addition to providing training services 
to Omanis the OSTC also, through its SANAD-programme, provides both funding and counseling 
services to help skilled, job-seeking Omanis with self-employment projects (Jax). 
 
Private Sector Development: Historically, the public sector has been the Sultanate’s primary 
economic actor. Unfortunately, as is frequently the case with public enterprise, it has been 
marked by inefficiency and low productivity. By transitioning economic power into the hands of 
the private sector, as the argument goes, it will allow for competition to force an economy to 
run at full efficiency.  
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Encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) is crucial to building the private sector. One of the 
most significant measures taken by the Omani government towards this goal was the creation 
of the Omani Center for Investment Promotion and Export Development (OCIPED) in 1996 
under Royal Decree No. 59/96. OCIPED encourages foreign investment by marketing Oman to 
potential investors abroad. This is through exhibitions and road shows, marketing campaigns, 
data collection, and finding investment partners (ociped.com). 
A piece of FDI-attracting policy championed by the Omani government is the US-Omani free 
trade agreement (OFTA). While this agreement has been criticized as being one-sided on the 
part of the United States (Stiglitz 97), both Omani and American representatives have held it in 
very high regard (PEIE). By giving American businessmen national status, which allows them to 
start and own businesses just like Omani citizens, the Omani government hopes to see US 
investors flock to the country. 
In addition to these explicit measures, there are several soft elements which help encourage 
FDI into the Omani economy. Many of Oman’s more resource-endowed neighbors, such as 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar, have used the stability of their wealth to promote controversial 
political goals. Fortunately, Oman has not had such luxury and has remained politically neutral 
during Sultan Qaboos’ tenure. This has helped to make Oman a more attractive place for 
foreign investors, as Oman is seen as more stable and thus less risky (Wilson 1).  
 
Export Promotion: One of the key elements of global integration is the export of Omani 
products. Oman is an excellent location geographically. At the base of the Arabian Peninsula it 
is better able to accept materials imported from abroad at cheaper costs than its neighbors. As 
a result it has the potential to serve as the supplier for the rest of region.  
As OCIPED’s name would suggest, in addition to promoting FDI it also works towards export 
development. OCIPED’s primary methods of assistance are promotion through exhibitions and 
helping companies locate potential market opportunities (OCIPED). 
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The Omani government also hopes that the OFTA will help promote Omani exports. By 
eliminating trade barriers with the United States, the largest consumer market in the world, the 
sale of Omani goods to America is expected to increase substantially in the near future. 
Finally, to help combat the effects of the Dutch Disease, Oman established the State General 
Reserve Fund (SGRF) in 1980. While owned by the Omani government and administered by the 
Ministry of Finance, the SGRF is a sovereign institution. Its assets are currently valued at over $8 
billion USD (Investopedia).  
 
Infrastructure Development: One of the most valuable elements of industrialization is FDI. If a 
government can entice a firm to start a company there, the company, acting independently, will 
inevitably bring revenue into the country. One of the best ways governments can spur 
development is by creating a system in which a company can work effectively. Infrastructural 
development is critical in this goal. Generally speaking, Oman’s infrastructural development has 
made massive improvements since 1970, however to be globally competitive, it will need to be 
improved further. 
Oman currently has three port facilities – one each in Salalah, Muscat, and Sohar. Currently, the 
Omani government is working on the construction of a major port and dry dock at Duqm (Oman 
Observer). The Duqm port, at an expected cost of OR 1.7 billion, is expected to be completed in 
2012. The port is designed to be the catalyst for the development of Duqm as a city of industry. 
One of the most significant projects Oman has planned for the future is its contribution to the 
Gulf Railway. Oman, in a joint effort between six Gulf States, will help construct a 2,000 
kilometer railway network (Prabhu). The rail will run from Kuwait to Southern Oman, and 
potentially further into Yemen. The rail network, which will include freight service, is expected 
to drastically cut the cost of transportation within GCC states. At staggering total cost estimates 
of up to $25 billion USD, the Gulf Railway is a serious investment, and there is still the inherent 
risk that it won’t spur the economic growth needed to justify its construction. 
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Section 3: The Implications of Oman’s Industrial Development Policies: Have They Worked? 
 
Response from Companies 
The primary purpose of this paper is to determine the effect that governmental policies have 
had on Oman’s manufacturing and export sector. Although the sector has shown significant 
growth during the past decade, this cannot be off-handedly attributed to Oman’s economic 
policies. This paper aims to determine the causality of this growth, and then, working from 
research gathered from companies in the Rusayl Industrial Estate (RIE) as well as public 
institutions like the Ministry of Commerce (MONI), formulate policy changes which would serve 
to improve Oman’s manufacturing and export industry. The first element of this study was 
gathering research data from Omani manufacturing companies in the form of surveys and 
interviews. 
 
Problems Facing Manufacturing Companies in Oman 
 
The surveys distributed to the companies focused on two categories. The first half covered 
general problems the company faced. The latter half centered specifically on the company’s 
relations with public institutions. The survey results concerning general problems faced by the 
company are given in Figure 2. (Data is given in percentages) 
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Figure 2 – Survey Statements 
To what extent do you agree with these statements? (Mark the best response; leave blank if not applicable) 
Statement Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Our products can’t compete in American and European Markets 35.71 42.86 0 21.43 0 
There is a lack of skilled management in Oman 28.57 42.86 7.14 21.43 0 
Omanization policies have made it difficult to find labor 7.14 28.57 21.43 42.86 0 
The US-Omani Free Trade Agreement has helped our sales abroad 0 23.01 46.15 15.38 7.69 
Rusayl has enough infrastructure for our business to grow 0 14.29 21.43 57.14 7.14 
Omani customs duties hinder our operations 14.29 42.86 21.43 21.43 0 
The government does not effectively market Oman internationally 0 53.85 30.77 15.38 0 
It is more expensive to produce in Oman compared to elsewhere 0 53.85 15.38 30.77 0 
Government services have improved during the past five years 0 0 15.38 76.92 7.69 
There aren’t enough opportunities to market our product abroad 7.69 38.46 7.69 38.46 7.69 
Our company owes much of its success to government assistance 0 38.46 7.69 53.85 0 
The US-Omani Free Trade Agreement has harmed our business 7.69 53.85 38.46 0 0 
Not enough Omanis are studying what is needed for our business 0 23.08 15.38 53.85 7.69 
Shipping costs are prohibitively expensive 0 7.69 23.08 61.54 7.69 
Imported foreign machinery is affordable 0 28.57 7.14 64.29 0 
The government is doing all it can to help us 0 15.38 30.77 46.15 7.69 
There are better ways the government can help us 0 7.69 0 84.62 7.69 
Source: McWilliam, Tyler (Fieldwork, April 2011) 
Before the analysis of the dataset, it is important to note that these data cannot be read like 
election results. A majority reporting no problems does not mean that problems do not exist; it 
means that there is a minority with problems. Under the increasingly liberalized system of 
global trade networks, in which competition is intense, small problems or areas of even minor 
inefficiency can have hugely impactful results. 
However with that, generally speaking, the survey respondents gave very positive responses to 
the above statements. None of the respondents disagreed that the government services have 
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improved over the past five years, and only fifteen percent thought the government was not 
doing everything it could. However, with that a shocking 92% of companies agreed that there 
are better ways the government can help them, indicating that there is indeed inefficiency in 
government services. 
While company owners did not think that any government services were useless, they did give 
various suggestions to improve them. From the surveys, suggestions included streamlining 
government services to a single ‘one-stop-shop’, allowing for more expats to be hired, training 
Omanis, improving online service, more proactive ‘problem-solving’ services working within a 
specific time frame, implementing Omanization more gradually, and one company simply 
requested ‘better service’. 
One company manager talked about his problems with government bureaucracy, saying that 
“to solve a problem, you need to drive to one place, wait in line, drive to another place, wait in 
line, wait many weeks, and then maybe after that maybe your problem is fixed,” (Personal 
Interview 2011). He complained that government services do not work within a specified time 
frame, so when companies need a problem fixed by a certain date, they cannot rely on the 
government for assistance. 
Interestingly enough, few of the companies reported having been positively affected by the 
OFTA. Only slightly over 20% responded that it has helped sales abroad, with a majority 
reporting either neutrally or in disagreement. In an interview, the manager of one company 
even said “We used to export to the US and Canada, but we stopped six months ago because of 
rising costs” (Personal Interview 2011). The OFTA also seemed to do little in terms of promoting 
American investment into manufacturing. In an interview with a representative from PEIE, an 
American-owned company was cited as being an example of the success of the OFTA. However, 
in an interview with the manager of that company, it was discovered that it had in fact been 
recently bought buy an Indian investment firm, with “rising costs” being cited as the reason for 
the sale (Personal Interview 2011).  It is important to note that implementing the OFTA came 
was not free for the Omani government.  During negotiations the US insisted that if an FTA 
were to be made then conditions in the Sultanate needed to be on par with America. As a result 
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the FTA contains passages addressing issues like labor rights, intellectual property guidelines, 
telecommunications, and business ethics (Tepitino 41). This means that in exchange for access 
to American markets and investors, Oman now has to pay to enforce copyrights, meet labor 
needs, and provide infrastructure. If the OFTA fails to live up to its expectations these costs 
would have been in vain. 
While most companies faced no problems with the infrastructure in Rusayl, a shortage of 
natural gas has wreaked havoc for gas-burning companies planning to expand. The manager of 
a steel-rolling mill in Rusayl explained how this shortage of natural gas had “caused [the 
company’s] plans for a new factory, a $12 milion USD project, to be stopped,” (Personal 
Interview 2011). An interview with an employee from another company revealed that they 
were facing problems with the lack of physical space. He lamented that in order to make room 
for their latest factory expansion, “[The company] had to break many mountains,” (Personal 
Interview 2011). These faults in infrastructure availability hinder growth, and, if the problem 
persists, can potentially discourage FDI and local entrepreneurship. 
Whereas one of Oman’s goals is creating ‘upstream’ enterprises, or enterprises that are 
vertically linked, only 35% of the responding companies used Omani raw materials, with the 
remaining 65% relying on foreign imports. When questioned about this, companies primarily 
cited the lack of domestic resource availability as the reason for import. 
In 2003, under the direction of the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center, a survey including similar 
questions was distributed to 31 companies in the Sohar Industrial Estate (SIE), from which 14 
responses were received. The following Figure 3 shows the results of select questions from the 
Sohar study matched with their appropriate counterpart from this study. (Data from 2003 is on 
the left, represented by darker shades) 
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Figure 3 – Improvements Since 2003  
 
Source: McWilliam, Tyler (Field Work, April 2011); Bakheet, Adil-Hassan (Fieldwork, June-August 2003) 
 
This comparison works on the assumption that problems facing companies in Sohar can be 
applied to companies operating in the Rusayl Industrial Estate. Under this assumption, one can 
observe a clear change in the question “Imported foreign machinery is affordable” Whereas in 
2003 nearly 60% of companies cited this as a problem, the results were nearly reversed come 
2011, with just over 60% agreeing that machinery costs are manageable. Both the 2003 and 
2011 survey results showed a clear split on whether or not there were enough opportunities to 
market abroad. If anything, there was a drop from ‘neutral’ to ‘disagree’ during the past decade. 
This indicates that government services towards helping promotion abroad have largely 
stagnated since 2003. Omanization was and still is a problem for many companies. Results from 
2003 are nearly identical to 2011, showing that there still is not a sufficient supply of skilled and 
willing Omani laborers. 
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It was also observed that there was a correlation between responses and the relative size of the 
business. For example, larger businesses tended to have little difficulty meeting Omanization 
requirements, less trouble meeting costs, and more favorable opinions of government policies. 
A selection of responses where these differences were particularly noticeable is shown below in 
Figure 4. (Size was determined by the respondents own judgment) 
 
Figure 4 – Responses by Company Size 
 
Source: McWilliam, Tyler (Fieldwork, April 2011) 
 
It is apparent that there exists a duality between new, smaller companies and the more 
established, larger ones. This duality is the most noticeable in the response to Omanization. 
Omanization policies negatively affected SMEs far more often than they did large scale 
enterprises. Additionally, a higher proportion of large scale companies owed their success to 
government policies. However, despite this difference, in interview, companies of all sizes cited 
the hard work of their employees as their primary force for success. One manager of a large 
enterprise who described himself as “100% capitalist” said that government plays only a minor 
role in how he runs his business, saying that “the only times I talk to them is when I need their 
permission for something,” (Personal Interview 2011) 
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The second part of the distributed surveys focused on the relationship between companies and 
public institutions. This was divided into two parts, the amount of communication and the 
amount of help received. The raw data is shown below in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 - Relationship with Public Institutions 
How much do you communicate with the following institutions? (1 Not at all; 2 A little; 3 Some; 4 A lot; 5 A great deal) 
Institution 1 2 3 4 5 
OCIPED 3 3 3 2 0 
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) 1 5 3 4 0 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) 1 1 5 5 0 
The Public Establishment for Industrial Estates (PEIE) 1 1 4 5 1 
The Ministry of Manpower 1 1 5 2 4 
 
How much do the following institutions help your business? 
Institution 1 2 3 4 5 
OCIPED 2 4 3 2 0 
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) 1 4 4 4 0 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) 1 3 4 4 0 
The Public Establishment for Industrial Estates (PEIE) 0 5 4 2 2 
The Ministry of Manpower 0 6 2 2 3 
Source: McWilliam, Tyler (Fieldwork, April 2011) 
One of the most troubling results from these two datasets is the amount of help provided by 
OCIPED. Most companies reported OCIPED as helping either a little bit or not at all. While some 
reported OCIPED’s services as helping ‘a lot’, this number is not as high as it should be. Half of 
OCIPED’s purpose is the promotion of exports, so it would be expected that their assistance 
would be higher than reported. 
Companies, when asked to describe how these institutions help them, mainly cited ‘approvals’, 
‘market statistics’, and ‘infrastructure’. While these help companies start and plan their 
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business, they do not, with the exception of ‘market statistics’, help companies once they have 
begun operating. 
From the research, it would appear that, once established, companies have generally been 
responsible for their own growth. Institutions like the Oman Development Bank and industrial 
zones like Rusayl have helped encourage companies to start, but after that government services 
tend to wane in their efficiency.  
 
 Response from Public Institutions 
 
The above research data and conclusions were presented to appropriate public institutions. 
Their responses varied from concurrence with the data to its outright rejection.  
One public official working in the Ministry of Commerce remarked how several of the results 
found matched his expectations. In relation to the problems facing SMEs, he said “SMEs are 
very important, they account for ninety percent of businesses in Oman, but only produce three 
or four percent of GDP; they must be developed more,” (Personal Interview 2011). He 
recognized the faults of Omanization, saying that Omanis have a tendency to leave jobs shortly 
after being hired, making them not as dependable as expat workers.  
Despite the faults, he expressed confidence in manufacturing growth. He explained that 
“[Oman] has the potential to have a good manufacturing sector because of oil revenue,” and 
that, with current growth trends, the manufacturing sector will far surpass the 15% of GDP goal 
set forth by the Vision 2020 goals. 
In response to the natural gas shortage, a representative at PEIE explained that “it is not under 
[PEIE’s] authority”. He said that natural gas is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Oil and 
Gas, expecting them to fix it sometime during 2012. Although no date was given, he said PEIE 
also plans to have increases in online service and the eventual creation of a ‘one-stop shop’ 
which could better assist companies. 
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One official, speaking on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, remarked that the 
sample size of the survey was too small to determine true national interest. He determined that 
“the only way to truly discover the companies’ interests is through a comprehensive survey 
administered by Omani businesses,” (Personal Interview May 2011) He argued that companies 
were too self-interested, using their membership in the chamber only to promote their own 
companies goals. In relation to international exhibitions, he said that “it is in the national 
interest is to promote Oman, however the companies want only to secure contracts,” He cited 
conflicts of interest and how the policies proposed by companies focus on very specific issues. 
With respect to the official, this is a very jaded view. Companies, in a free-market system, do 
not advertise nations, they advertise products. It is to be assumed that companies, and their 
representatives, will work primarily towards bettering their own situation. The OCCI is facing a 
form of the principle-agent problem. While those in charge of the OCCI want to see it work 
towards their interests, those composing it want to see it work towards theirs. Companies will 
produce recommendations which help companies. The OCCI is a semi-governmental institution, 
serving only an advisory role in policy making. Recommendations from its members channel 
upwards to the chief of the committee. However, it is under his discretion whether or not these 
recommendations actually proceed from the Chamber to the Ministries. If they are judged to 
be not in line with national interest, they are discarded. This creates a great deal of inefficiency.  
 
Section 4: Recommendations for Policy Change 
As explained earlier, the purpose of this document is to find ways that the government can 
better help to provide for its fledgling manufacturing and export sector. Recommendations 
were formulated using the input from companies in Rusayl as well as officials from the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, OCIPED, and the Oman 
Development Bank. Based on this research, this document presents five recommendations for 
policy change that will better help facilitate manufacturing and export development in the 
Sultanate.  
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Government Streamlining 
Private enterprise dependency on government support is a bad thing. The Omani private sector 
would seem to agree, as it has become apparent through conversations with business owners 
(some Omani, some expat) that they don’t want to rely on the government for support. Several 
factory managers, purely free-market capitalist in their outlook, simply wanted the government 
to provide a business environment in which they can freely operate.  
Many factory managers expressed frustration with the complexity of government services. By 
streamlining services to a single window, or better yet, a single website, factory owners would 
be able to focus more on running their business. The ‘one-stop shop’ promised by PEIE helps to 
meet this, but it should be expanded to cover the services provided by all government 
institutions. As was seen with the natural gas shortage in Rusayl, there is still the potential for 
problems to simply be handed off to other ministries. Streamlined service would allow for a 
single administration to handle any problems companies would face. 
To help attract FDI, OCIPED should be restructured after Ireland’s IDA. It should be given more 
autonomy and the funding to open offices in key cities around the world, such as Silicon Valley, 
Seoul, and Tokyo. This would help to establish personal contacts between potential foreign 
investors and also in finding potential contracts for Omani businesses. Government services 
should help to improve the availability of information. As one of the causes of market failure is 
imperfect information, services should help to provide companies with contract opportunities, 
material prices, and potential investors. These facilities should also be made readily available 
online. 
 
Omanization 
One of the biggest problems facing companies in Rusayl, especially SMEs, is Omanization. 
Omanization policies, while they cost the government little to enact, are not free. The costs of 
Omanization flow directly to companies. When companies need skilled labor, and the supply is 
not available in Oman, they must look abroad for expat labor. However, when Omanization 
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policies prevent them from hiring more foreign labor, costs are incurred. Some companies 
simply accept running inefficiently with unsuitably skilled employees, while other companies 
may hire an Omani in a ‘window seat’ position, one which has little real responsibility or 
productivity, simply so they can open up space to hire more skilled expats. 
SMEs have proven to be critical in industrial development, as was seen in the case of Thailand, 
wherein fifty percent of companies employed less than twenty workers (Hussey 8). It is 
important that the government therefore ensure that they are not being overlooked when 
drafting policy. 
It would appear as if the Omani government is faced with two options: either continue 
Omanization policies at the expense (and potential loss) of fledgling SMEs – thus leading to 
continued unrest from disgruntled Omani business owners, or, cancel Omanization and face 
continued unrest from unemployed Omanis, disgruntled by the governments apparent apathy 
toward their plight. This would seem to be a Morton’s Fork of sorts, a decision wherein each 
choice leads to the same, unpleasant outcome. However, a solution to this dilemma has been 
presented by (Al-Rawas 2009). 
As was mentioned earlier, there is a duality between SMEs and large-scale companies. While 
the SMEs struggle to meet Omanization requirements and keep costs down, large-scale 
companies far surpass their requirements. An ingenious solution for this problem which 
capitalizes on this duality was developed by Basil Ahmed Al-Rawas. Al-Rawas, inspired by the 
credit-based cap-and-trade system developed to lower carbon emissions, suggests that 
Omanization can be improved through the creation of labor credits. Al-Rawas explains the 
following: 
“Firms achieving more than 35 percent Omanization can gain extra credits points. For 
instance, firm A could receive 5 points if it achieves 40 percent Omanization. It could 
then sell these credits to firm B that has a 30 percent Omanization ratio and cannot 
achieve the target ratio of 35 percent. The price of the permits, (5 percent of 
Omanization), that would be paid by firm B to firm A would not exceed the marginal 
cost of firm B of achieving the extra 5 percent Omanization. The payment would go 
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directly to the MMP which will transfer the credit to firm A in the form of free training 
programs for their extra Omani workers,” (Al-Rawas 43) 
Expats from South-Asia generally live away from their families, sending money to them home in 
the form of remittances. Al-Rawas explained in an interview that, “If [South-Asian expats] fear 
that they will be replaced, they will be more hesitant to bring relatives to Oman, and instead 
will keep sending money out of Oman,” (Personal Interview 2011). This credit-based system of 
Omanization would give expats more job security, and thus they would bring their families to 
Oman, which would help to keep the money from flowing from the country. 
A perceived flaw in this program is buying the credits from the Ministry of Manpower and 
funding sales with training programs. If the companies themselves were able to sell their credits, 
there would be more of an incentive to meet Omanization requirements. Credits would be seen 
as a valuable commodity with a tangible value. The revenue from credit sales could then be 
spent under the company’s own discretion, which might even include the training programs. 
As was seen in the case of Thailand, which was able to outcompete its neighbor Malaysia 
because of its lack of mandatory Thai employment, labor force nationalization policies can 
wreak havoc on attracting FDI and development. This solution would help to lower the costs 
Oman has undoubtedly incurred through Omanization. 
 
Building the Skills of the Omani Labor Force 
The Omani government is well aware of the need to create a skilled local labor force, and it has 
established policies to help facilitate it. While it is hard to judge the effectiveness of current 
initiatives, as it will not truly be known until students enter the labor force, there are changes 
that can be made to these policies that would better help the manufacturing industry.  
Specialized vocational and technical education programs should be more readily available and 
subject to government subsidy. While formal education and the creation of experts would be 
ideal and should still be developed, these are long processes and will not produce results until 
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several years from now. Technical schools are able to help Omanis join the labor force in far 
less time.  
On-the-job training programs, which are used by many of the manufacturers in Oman, should 
be subsidized by the government. By eliminating the cost of training, companies would be more 
likely to consider hiring unskilled Omanis over skilled expats. Additionally the savings on 
training could be used on to help the company in other ways, such as R&D. 
 
Infrastructural Development 
It was observed that shipping costs proved prohibitively problematic for nearly all companies 
surveyed. Currently, Oman’s plans for the Gulf Railway have it run south from the UAE border 
and eventually terminate in the southern port city of Duqm. This paper cannot stress enough 
the importance of this rail network and applauds the initiative of the Omani government. The 
speedy completion of this network should be a top priority for government authorities. 
Additionally, the possibility of extending the terminus further west to the Yemeni border has 
been considered. However, this is not yet official. This document strongly recommends taking 
this course of action. Although Yemen is currently facing devastating problems in economic 
development as well as political unrest, the fact remains that Yemen’s situation will eventually 
improve. Yemen has the potential to become a key export market for Oman. With a population 
of nearly thirty million, rivaling that of Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s burgeoning consumer market will 
demand great amounts of imported goods. This of course could take many decades, but if 
Omani companies are able to establish their products early in the Yemeni markets, it could 
prove to be a very valuable investment when the time eventually comes. 
 
Increased Government Openness 
This recommendation comes not from the companies interviewed, but rather from the 
researcher’s personal opinion. Most factory owners interviewed showed a distinct 
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apprehensiveness when learning of the purpose of this research. This was even more visible 
when managers were pushed to give their own personal opinions on government effectiveness. 
It is feared that this apprehensiveness may have even affected the survey results. 
It is no secret that public criticism of the Omani government is highly discouraged and in some 
cases even illegal. Companies are extremely hesitant to criticize government policies, even 
when they have suggestions, which in some cases may even be better than the current policies. 
A representative of the  Chamber of Commerce and Industry argued that “government 
represented by OCCI and OCIPED opened the door to commercial openness,” (Personal 
Interview May 2011).  The OCCI, which is made up of private sector representatives, helps, but 
many businesses, specifically SMEs, cannot afford to represent themselves, and there is still 
hesitation to publicly oppose policies. This is not about political philosophy, but rather 
economic efficiency. Can a government which does not encourage constructive criticism be as 
effective as one that is open to suggestions? The rentier-state model, of which Oman is an 
example, suggests that citizens give up personal liberty in exchange for government benefits. 
This is generally done to help ensure that the current government remains in place. However, in 
Oman there is a genuine respect for the government. It has, historically, acted in the best 
interests of its people and improved life in the Sultanate greatly over the past 40 years. It has 
earned the trust of its people. However, it is in the opinion of this researcher that through the 
government’s closed-door tendency it has missed the opportunity to hear the true problems 
faced by SMEs and thus has failed to reach its fully efficient potential. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the critical approach taken by this paper, it is important to note that many of the 
survey responses were indeed supportive of most government policy, indicating that much of 
Omani policy has indeed worked. However, the recommendations given in this paper, if 
followed, will enhance the growth of Oman’s manufacturing and export sector. Of course, it is 
entirely possible that the Omani government has considered taking the actions recommended 
above, yet has chosen not to enact them. This could be because the Omani government simply 
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does not want to see Oman become a major manufacturer. This would explain its heavy 
emphasis on national image and tourism, which, in this researcher’s opinion, is 
disproportionate to the emphasis placed on manufacturing.  The creation of an export-intensive 
economy would drastically change Oman’s image, and image held highly by the Omani 
government. 
Oman has worked to create its international image as one of a historically rich people, with a 
country decorated with forts, castles, dhows and mountains. To create an economy based on 
industry and manufacturing would serve to potentially disrupt or possibly even destroy this 
image. This research understands that the government may simply not wish to see its country 
change in such a way. But as oil revenues decrease and eventually cease, the time Oman has to 
commit to a sustainable path to development slims. What is the cost of protecting this image 
when faced with such a closing window of opportunity? This is a decision that must soon be 
made by the Omani government. 
 
So there it is.  
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